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Jay Ziskin 
The Future of Clinical 
Assessme nt 
Professor Emeritus, California State University, Los Angeles 
At the outset, this writer 's frame of reference should be made clear. It is the 
perspective of the author of a book that contains more than fi ve hundred refer-
ences from the scientific and professional literature which raise doubts about the 
experti se of clinicians in their role as diagnostic ians in general, and also, spec ifi-
cally, within the forensic arena. The perspective further is that of one who 
provides a consultation service to lawyers pointing out to them the weakness and 
shortcomings of psychiatric and psychological reports and testimony both in 
terms of the inherent problems and of any specific deficiencies of omiss ion or 
commiss ion in the particul ar case. Thus, clinical assessments are o ften seen in 
their most public form and under conditions in which weaknesses and deficien-
cies are most vulnerable to exposure. 
Clinical assessment has been defined as " the process by which cl inicians ga in 
understanding of the patient necessary for making informed dec isions" (Kor-
chin , 1976, p. 124). Korchin and Schuldberg (1 98 1) e laborate, 
Clincal diagnosis , in the res tricted sense, may be incl uded , but more usually the 
intent is description and prediction towards the ends of planning, executing, and 
evaluating therapeutic interventions and predicting future behav ior. Any of numer-
ous techniques can be used , singularl y o r in combination , depending on the orienta-
tion of the clinician and the specific ques tions for which answers are sought. T hus, 
interv iews with the client or wi th others; observation in natura l or contrived situa-
tions; or the use of tests of differe nt functions, varying in breath , objecti vity , 
psychometric refine ment , and infe rence might all be included. The immed iate goal 
may be the re lati ve ly precise measurement of a particular psychological function or 
the construction of a 'work ing image or model of the person ' (S undberg & Ty ler, 
1962), (p. 11 47) . 
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Generally, clinical assessment is di stinguished from other types of psycholog-
ical assessment such as educational assessment or personnel assessment by its 
focus on determination of the presence or absence of psychopathology or de-
viance- that is, problems or di scomforts the individual is having with himself/ 
herself or problems or discomforts the individual is causing to soc iety or other 
people . Clinical assessment concerns itself not only with the nature of the psy-
chopathology but also with its extent , the implications of its nature and extent for 
the individual's prospective functioning , the potenti al for altering such function-
ing and the means to accomplish such alteration. 
THE CURRENT STATUS OF CLiNCIAL ASSESSMENT 
The current status of psychological assessment generally , and psychological 
testing particularly , could be described as paradox ica l. The demise of psycholog-
ical testing has been announced often enough over the past two decades . Yet 
there has been no funeral. There is no corpse because life has not yet left the 
body and indeed , there are those who assel1 that not only is the patient not dying, 
but that in fact thi s patient is on the way to recovery (Korchin & Schuldberg, 
198 1) . Rorer and Widiger (1983) state, 
It is no secret that personality assessment has been in big trouble as it has come 
under attack fro m both expert and lay critics. Assessment takes up a decreasing 
proportion of the professional practitioners time, occupies a place of decreasing 
importance in the university graduate curriculum and has been legally outl awed in 
many selection situations . Many have reacted by jumping what they believe to be a 
sinking ship , others have come to the dcfense of the establishment , and have argued 
that with a few refinements we can continue with business as usua l . ... Clearly (to 
these reviewcrs), it is not a time for business as usual nor is it time to abandon ship . 
Rather, it is a time to question our bas ic assumptions. (p . 433 ) 
Several articles (Davids, 1973; Leavitt , 1973 ; Lewandowski & Saccuzzo , 
1976; Petzelt & Craddick, 1978) have indicated that many graduate programs in 
clinical psychology have de-emphas ized the teaching of psychological testing . 
Nevertheless, it seems that employers of clinical psychologists by an overwhelm-
ing majority continue to consider the capacity to perform psychological testing as 
one of the major requirements for employment at their fac ility . The courts, 
usually perceived as bas tions of conservative hard headedness when it comes to 
the admission of evidence, no longer debate the admissibility of conclusions 
based on psychological testing , despite a mountain of evidence (Ziskin , 198 1) 
which suggests that there is too much doubt about these procedures for them to 
meet admiss ibility requirements that continue to keep other types of evidence 
such as conclusions based on polygraph examinations out of the court room. 
Judging by developments in the fie ld of psychology and law such as the estab-
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lishment of Division 4 1 of the American Psychologica l Association, a division on 
psychology and law, and the establishment of the American Board of Forensic 
Psychology and my own experience, it seems more likely that the use of cl inical 
assessment in the lega l situation is expanding. This conflicted or sick, but not 
dying, status of the fi eld arises from a number of factors. 
In part clinical assessment owes its continued ex istence to a serious need for 
its product. With a multiplic ity of treatment methods and particularly with a 
proli feration of psychotropic medications, it has become more necessary than 
ever to evaluate the nature of the patients problems in order to utilize the most 
appropriate kind of treatment and/or medication . Similarly in the forensic situa-
tion , the questions of state of mind or psychological capac ities or propensities are 
of extreme importance so that any modality which has some degree of respecta-
bility and purports to provide answers is eagerly welcomed . Further, assessment 
is a fi eld in which new methodologies and/or revi sions of old methodologies 
occur with great frequency such that there is always the hope that today's new 
method will provide' ' the answer. " The vast size of the graveyard of yesterday's 
great hopes does not appear to dampen enthusiasm. 
Several factors impede the progress of clinica l assessment toward a healthy 
state . 
1. Lack of an Adequate Knowledge Base 
Perhaps the most important of all , is the absence of a large, re levant , adequately 
validated body of knowledge on which to base clinical assessment . The mental 
health fi eld consists of a conglomeration of unvalidated theories about human 
behavior , psychological conditions and so on. Havens ( 198 1) states, 
Psychi atry as an agreed on body of knowledge hardly exi sts, instead we have a 
variety of psychiatrys. Psycho-analyt ic psychi atry, biological and behavioristic 
psychiatry , social and interpersonal psychiatry. ex istential analys is-the list can be 
made even longer. (p . 1279) 
All of these theories possess some supporting data and all have a body of 
followers and indeed , many of them have substanti al bodies of followers. But the 
existence of so many di fferent theories (and they are di fferent) defines the 
problem because in order to know what it is that one ought to be assess ing one 
has to have a bas is in knowledge of what variables are re levant in human 
psychology and how those variables interact. Thus, it could be argued fo r exam-
ple, that many of the present ills of clinical assessment spring from the fact that 
during the growth period of clinical assessment , the most popular theory of 
human behav ior was the psychoanalytic theory and thus much of the early 
development of testing revolved around attempts to assess psychoanalytic vari-
ables . Given the skepticism concerning psychoanalytic theory that has emerged 
in the past fe w decades, it may be no wonder that the enterpri se failed . 
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2. Lack of an Adequate Classification System 
A parallel problem has been the lack of an adequate class ification system for 
diagnosing or classifying mental disorders. While it can be, and is, argued by 
some clinicians that formal diagnoses are not necessary for treatment purposes, 
the fact is that most treatment modalities, procedures and medications are based 
on forma l diagnoses . The dismal history of the official diagnostic classification 
system, the diagnostic and statistical manuals published by the American Psychi-
atric Association ought to be well known to everyone in the fie ld . DSM-l was 
published in 1952 and found to be quite poor and was replaced by DSM-ll in 
1968 . It soon became apparent that DSM-ll was not adequate to the task and 
work was shortly thereafter commenced cu lminating in the production of DSM-
III in 1980, representing a rad ical departure from the previous manuals . While 
one can read ily acknowledge that DSM-Ill is a considerable improvement over 
its predecessors, as it does specify with some clarity what the criteria are for the 
various mental disorders, recognizes psycho-social factors, and provides prelimi-
nary reli ability research data, there is little reason to hope that DSM-lIl will 
prove to be an adequate classification system . 
Regarding DSM-lII, Eysenck, Wakefield , and Friedman ( 1983) provide an 
extensive reivew and state the conclusion that "This new scheme is based on 
foundations so insecure, so lacking in scientific support, and so contrary to well -
established facts that its use can only be justified in terms of social need" (p. 
167) . They warn psychologists of the weaknesses of a scheme based on demo-
cratic voting rather than sc ientific research and they assert that the reliabi li ties are 
unacceptably low and there is a lack of indication of validity. In 1982 at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Assoc iation, a debate was held 
under the tit le "Do the advantages of DSM-lII outweigh the disadvantages?" 
The debaters were Dr. Gerald L. Klerman , Dr. Robert L. Spitzer who was the 
chairman of the committee which developed DSM-lIl , Dr. Robert Michels and 
Dr. George E. Vai llant, all psychiatrists of some eminence . This debate was 
taped and can be obtained from the American Psychiatric Association. One 
outstanding characteristic of the debate was the absence of a strong assertion by 
speakers on either side indicating that DSM-lll really is a "good" diagnostic 
system. Even more impress ive was the unan imity with which each of the partici-
pants referred to the coming of DSM-IV. 
The literature contains numerous negative assertions concerning DSM-IlI 
(Ziskin , 1981). One must consider the effects of alterations in the definitions of 
various psychopathological entities every decade or so on the validity , mean-
ingfulness and applicability of previous research. It seems quite likely that a 
research population described as "schizophrenic " in the 1960s would be a 
different population from a clinica l population described as schizophrenic in the 
1980s. Keisling (1981) found that when a group of patients admitted to St. 
Elizabeths hospital in 1979 and 1980 were re-diagnosed on the bas is of DSM-III 
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criteria , the proportions of those diagnosed with schi zophrenia and those diag-
nosed manic-depress ive were altered radically . Therefore , in terms of applica-
tion , one cannot apply the previous reasearch to patients presently diagnosed 
with the same label. At the very least , the clinician must entertain doubts regard-
ing the application of research performed on a group of patients des ignated as 
having a certain di sorder in the past to patients des ignated as having that di sorder 
in the present when it is known that there is a strong poss ibility that the two 
patient populations might be different. 
Probably the only safe course for clinicians is to di sregard any research done 
prior to the publication of DSM-Ill for conditions where descriptions have been 
changed. Unfortunately, this would leave them in the position of trying to deal 
with entities for which virtually no research information would be avail able for 
several years . Further, by the time the research is completed and published , 
DSM-IV will be out and the process will have to start all over again . 
3. Situation and Examiner Effects 
Situation and the examiner effects are problems that have plagued clinical eval-
uation as ev idenced in the literature over the past severa l decades continuing up 
to the present. See, for example, (Anastasi, 1982; Arkes , 198 1; Bartol, 1983; 
Treece, 1982). "S ituation effects" refers to the contamination of data obtained 
in a clinical examination by temporary events which surround the time of the 
examination. For example, if the subject has had a fight with his wife that 
morning, or if he has been scared out of his wits by a close call on the freeway or 
if she is involved in a lawsuit out of which she hopes to obtain a great deal of 
money for a relatively minor injury and is very anxious about the outcome, all 
such events can have an effect on the individual' s psychological state at the time 
of the examination and cause him to produce data which could easily be seen by 
the clinician as an enduring characteristic. This has been more broadly referred to 
in the state vs . trait controversy which involves the problem of trying to tease out 
of the data that which represents relatively permanent characteristics of the 
individual versus that which is a resultant of some temporary condition . "Exam-
iner effects" refers to the influence of the examiner and examiner subject interac-
tion, not onl y on the data that is produced but on the data that is attended to and 
recorded and the interpretation of the data as well. Decades of studies (Ziskin, 
1981 , Chapter 6) have shown that the data produced and recorded and the 
interpretation of the data are influenced by such factors as the theoretical orienta-
tion of the examiner, personal characteristics of the examiner such as age, sex, 
race and socio-economic status, training and experience, personality charac-
teristics and appearance as well as social or political values and attitudes and the 
expectations of the examiner. The effect of situational and examiner variables in 
reducing the reliability and validity of clinical evaluations should be obvious. it 
is difficult to avoid despair concerning an evaluation process in which the out-
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come is partially determined by time, place and purpose and which one of many 
examiners conducted the examination. 
4. Multicultural Issues 
Research, particularly in the last decade and a half, has raised questions concern-
ing the assessment of members of ethnic minority groups and has left those 
questions unresolved. Thus, a plethora of studies (Ziskin, 1981, Chapter 9) 
indicate that it may be inadvisable to assess members of ethnic minority groups 
on the basis of white majority normative data. These studies indicate that there 
may be significantly different response patterns for members of ethnic minority 
groups particularly on tests of personality or psychopathology or that even where 
the response patterns may be similar that the behavioral correlates of the re-
sponses may be different for ethnic minority members (nearly 50 such studies are 
reported in Ziskin 1981). Some research suggests that these ethnic differences 
disappear when education level and socio-economic level are controlled «Ber-
telson, Marks , & May 1982; Davis, 1975; Davis, Beck, & Ryan 1973; Davis & 
Jones 1974). On the other hand several researchers have found that statistically 
significant differences do exist in test data even when education level and/or 
socio-economic status are controlled (Brown, 1974; Cross, Barclay, & Berger, 
1978; Holland, 1979; Lowe & Hildman , 1972) . These issues were discussed in 
several papers at the first multiethnic conference on assessments held in Tampa, 
Florida in March of 1982 (Raymond D. Fowler, University of Alabama, Chair) . 
The fact that such a conference was held suggests that some of these issues have 
not been resolved. Similarly the problem of assessment of the members of ethnic 
minority groups was mentioned by several presenters at the 1983 program of the 
Society for Personality Assessment held in San Diego, California. It is clear that 
this is a problem that has not gone away and it remains to be seen whether re-
norming of many tests with special norms for members of ethnic minority groups 
(Gynther, Lachar, & Dahlstrom, 1978) or some other solution would be the 
answer. 
5. Ineffectiveness of Experience 
A matter of considerable concern is the apparent inability of clinicians to im-
prove their diagnostic reliability and validity as a result of experience. More 
than fifty publications (Ziskin, 1981) mostly within the last decade and a half 
indicate that experienced clinicians are no more reliable or accurate than are 
inexperienced clinicians and indeed a few studies indicate they are no more 
accurate than nonclinicians. These findings raise a serious question as to whether 
there is indeed a teachable and learnable skill of clinical assessment. The fact that 
experience does not sharpen such skill s seems to suggest that the answer is 
negative and thus, raises a question of whether time is being wasted in graduate 
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education and , indeed , raises the question as to whether the enterpri se should 
even be continued . Of course, it may be poss ible that some clinicians are very 
good at assessment on some basis other than training and experience. 
6. Illusory Correlation 
Illusory correlations create another serious problem for assessment (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1967) . As used originally by Chapman and Chapman, illusory cor-
relation describes a process wherein the clinician thinks that she observes a 
relation between an item of behavior and some psychological variable when, in 
fact, no such relationship can be shown to exist. The Chapman's use the example 
of the hypothes is from the Draw-A-Person test that drawing of large eyes or 
emphasizing eyes is associated with paranoia or paranoid tendencies . While the 
hypothes is is logical, the research literature fails to substantiate it. Therefore, the 
sign is invalid , the relationship is " illusory ." Large amounts of what clinicians 
are taught in their training consists of such illusory correlations and then in the 
course of their practice, clinicians reinforce such false beliefs in each other by 
repeating what they have been taught or what they think they have observed and 
to be sure from time to time someone who draws large eyes does turn out to be 
paranoid so that there is always a certain amount of confirmation . These myths 
are perpetuated and become principles of assessment. There is an urgent need for 
clinical assessment to shed its mythologies. 
7. Base Rates 
A similar problem exists with regard to ignoring population base rates. What this 
means is that in many instances, behavior that is more likely than not within the 
realm of normal is seized upon and twisted and di storted to make it into a 
symptom of psychopathology (Rosen han , 1973; Ziskin , 198 1) . I worked as a 
consultant on a case in which a very wealthy man who had been going around the 
country making substanti al investments to the point where his family was wor-
ried that he might diss ipate the fortune (all of which he had made himself) , and 
managed to get him to return home in the middle of the night on the ruse that his 
wife was very sick and needed hi s presence. He caught several connecting fli ghts 
and then drove for another 2 or 3 hours in the early hours of the morning to be 
greeted on the porch of his home by hi s perfec tly healthy wife and fa mily and 
four husky deputy sheriffs who told him that he needed to go to the hospital. He 
di sagreed very strongly with their recommendations whereupon they placed him 
in restraints and took him off to the mental hospital. The psychiatri st's report 
starts with thi s sentence, " On admiss ion Mr. X was hostil e and belligerent" 
presumably as an indication of the psychopathology later diagnosed as a manic 
state. Who would not be hostile and belligerent under those circumstances? 
Certainly it is more normal to be angry under those circumstances than to be 
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placid and accepting of having been fooled and forcibly hospitalized. Statements 
of this kind abound in clinical reports almost as though the clinician is determined 
to see everything through pathology colored glasses and rarely recognizes normal 
behavior when she sees it. This is carried to the point of absurdity in countless 
reports I have read in which the clinician states that the individual's scale score of 
9 on the WAIS shows that he is "below average" on that particular dimension. 
8. Art vs. Science 
There is controversy as to whether clinical assessment is and/or should be an art 
or a science with the most common opinion holding that it is a mixture of both . 
One can readily point to an analogy in medicine which is often described as an art 
based on science. I suspect that in clinical psychological assessment as well as in 
medicine, art begins where science leaves off. By that, I mean that generally 
speaking the professional would prefer to be able to generate conclusions based 
on hard scientific data, but where such data is lacking, art or intuition or what-
ever the clinician wishes to call it must necessarily be employed, although there 
is a seldom used alternative called "I do not know ." Neuropsychological assess-
ment may provide a useful example in this regard. In the late 1950s we were 
trained to assess brain damage with a combination of blunt instruments such as 
the Rorschach and the MMPI along with a Bender-Gestalt and the scatter patterns 
on a W AIS along with some behavioral observations, perhaps, in conjunction 
with or as a result of an EEG. Our knowledge of brain functioning was limited. 
We were forced to rely on certain signs that most of the time left us with 
equivocal conclusions and consequently with unsatisfactory validity (Goldstein 
& Deysach, 1973). Advances since then in computerized axial tomography and 
the development of neuropsychological batteries such as the Halstead-Reitan 
and the Luria-Nebraska allow not only conclusions of brain damage or disease 
at commonly reported rates of accuracy between 80% and 90% but enable the 
clinician to assess fairly well the locus and functional significance of the damage. 
It is, of course, true that some of the old tests are included within these neuro-
psychological batteries and that the behavioral observations of the clinician sti ll 
play some role. The heart of the procedures however, seem to fall to a much 
greater extent within the area of science with its formulas and quantification. 
Given the relatively short life of these methods, it is not at all unreasonable to 
anticipate that in the near future they will be producing results with even higher 
rates of accuracy. 
9. Assessment of "Whole" or "Part." 
Whether and when to attempt assessment of some specific attribute or to assess 
the "whole" person is another issue that must be resolved. In the new era of 
accountability and reduced availability of funds for health care, there will be less 
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tolerance for diagnostic procedures that are expensive, ineffi cient or unproven. 
Sometimes clinical assessment may not require anything more than the question 
" Tell me about your problems. " 
At least the foreseeable future is likely to see a continuation of this era of 
accountability and restriction of funds for both health research and health care. 
This suggests that clinical assessment is going to have to prove its value just as 
recent years have been increasing government pressure on psychotherapy to 
prove its value. 
10. Derivation of Clinical Conclusions 
Another issue that plagues the fi eld is the general inability of clinicians to 
explicate the bases for their conclusions and the processes that led them to the 
conclusions. Possibly this problem is more noticeable in the courtroom setting 
where penetrating questions can be asked of the clinician as to how conclusions 
were derived in contrast to the clinic setting where , except for occasional case 
conferences , the clinician is not called upon to justify or explain the source of hi s 
conclusions. My experience has been that in the courtroom setting , it has been 
virtually imposs ible to get sati sfactory information from the clinician in response 
to the question " What is the source of that conclusion?" The response almost 
invariably is more or less of the type' 'Not from any one thing, but from all of the 
data taken together. " Persistent questioning by the cross-examining lawyer sel-
dom clarifies the basis of conclusions, producing only the impression that the 
clinician does not know how the conclusions were derived . 
11 . Problems in Computer Interpretation 
Adair (1978) , reviewing automated or computeri zed MMPI interpretive services, 
generally notes that the question of validity in personality measurement con-
tinues to be a problem and that validity studies must be continued as a constant 
check on the accuracy of computer generated personality reports. He notes that 
some validational studies by various services have been done and "showed some 
promise." Butcher (1978) notes that most of the computerized interpretations are 
not pure actuari al systems but stem from programmed clinical dec ision rules 
utilizing clinical lore as the basic data in many cases. Butcher states: 
At this stage computerized narratives using psychological test based information is 
lillIe more than an art (or craji) disguised as a science. For the most part , the 
narrative reports are clinical hunches (often many steps removed fro m data) which 
are automatically cranked out by an e lectronic beast that will , without conscience, 
weave a devastating and sometimes contradictory tale about an individua l's person-
ality and problems. The computer is a generally willing and e ffic ient servant that 
will readily combine and g ive back stores of information from its vast memory . It 
cares not at all whether the information stored is from astro logy charts, MMPI code 
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books, Rorschach indices, or Somatatype descriptors ... the "artisan" nature of 
this endeavor has been demonstrated , the "clinical" astuteness is often compel-
ling, but the "sc ience" is often neglected or of tertiary consideration. (p. 942) 
Butcher additionally asserts that these clinical " hunches" are given more cred-
ibility than actually is deserved because of the aura of sc ientific mystique associ-
ated with computer outputs. He states: 
The computer approach to personality assess ment has been "oversold " and users 
place more stock in the "scientific truth " than is actuall y deserved. (p. 943) 
He states further : 
Once an MMPI interpretation program is written to print out sets of statements to 
given T score e levations, etc., a computer system can, in a matter of minutes, 
process thousands of cases producing an amount of halftruths and misstatements of 
staggering proportions . (p. 943) 
He states further: 
By far the most haunting problem and serious shortcoming of the automated MMPI 
assessment approach remains that of system validation. Demonstrating the validity 
of computer-generated narratives (like that of demonstrating clinical interpretations 
generall y) is a formidabl e task. (p. 944) 
Butcher points out that several attempts at validating narrative reports have been 
published but the criteria employed , frequent ly consumer ratings of acceptability 
or judged accuracy, are inadequate to provide a demonstration of validity . 
THE FUTURE 
My attempt to predict the future course of clinical assessment basically will 
follow two paths. One path springs from what seems to be reasonab le ex tensions 
of trends that can already be discerned . The other path springs fro m my imagina-
tion , including an out of character opt imisim with regard to what can be accom-
plished in clinical assessment , if not now , at least in the foreseeable future . 
1. Use of Computers 
Despite the stringent warnings of Butcher and others given earlier, there can be 
no doubt that computers are go ing to make an enourmous impact on assessment 
(Jackson & Paunonen 1980) . The" Actuarial vs. Clinical" controversy triggered 
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by Meehl' s famous publications on that topic portends thi s development . My 
summarization of the writing in this particular area of actuari al vs. clinical 
assessment suggests that the demonstrated superiority of the actuarial method has 
not yet made its impact on assess ment because of the limited instances in which 
the actuarial formulas were avail able . However, it seems clear that this problem 
is being remedied to some extent by ex isting computer programs and one cannot 
really doubt that the capacities of the computer will facilitate the development of 
many more formulas . T he speed with which the computer can analyze data and 
its capacities for storing and processing large amounts of information that are 
totally beyond the capacities of the individual clinician insure this deve lopment. 
One need only glance at the long running adverti sements in the APA Monilor 
offering computerized interpretation services to recognize that thi s approach has 
already established its economic viability . The task that remains to be accom-
plished is that of systematic validation . Most services report high degrees of 
customer sati sfaction and /or concurrence as evidence of validity. However, 
"customer sati sfaction " cannot be a substitute for published validation studies . 
Even more challenging than validation studies (and perhaps like ly to increase 
validity) is the poss ibility of combining data from di fferent sources into auto-
mated interpretive programs. At present the interpretive systems are mostly 
associated with the MMPI , although some indications of automated Rorschach 
interpretations have appeared . It does not seem utopian however, to imagine an 
automated assessment program which includes within it , for example , not only 
MMPI data and MMPI interpretive statements, but incorporates Rorschach data 
and interpretive statements as well as demographic and interview data. The size 
of the project may seem staggering but probably no more so than the idea of 
being able to feed data into a machine which was cabable o f responding with 
more than twenty thousand different interpretive statements might have seemed 
30 years ago . One day an operator may transmit into the computer an MMPI 
profile code along with the ratios from the Exner Comprehensive Rorschach 
System along with other similar data from these two tests and perhaps others plus 
demographic data plus quanti fied interview data . Such quanti fied interview data 
can be provided by means of structured interview procedures combined with the 
use of rating scales which will enable the interviewer to translate the data and 
even the behav ioral observations into quanti fied form . Thus for example, the 
clinician rather than writing a full report say ing that the patient showed " fl at 
affect" will be able to punch in a number on a statement concerning range of 
affect. In this manner, it may become possible for the computer to actually do 
what clinic ians say and think they actually do when they utilize information from 
a number of diagnostic sources in reaching their conclusions. Thus for example, 
when the clinic ians say they use a battery of tests it has been my experience that 
they use relative ly little in formation fro m the battery. The computer however, 
will be able to use vastly greater amounts of such in formation. 
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2. Classification Systems 
There will almost certainly be a new classification system. Judging from the 
debate held by the American Psychiatric Assoc iation in 198 1, soon there will be 
a DSM-IV that is likely to di ffer in substanti al respects from DSM-III . Clinicians 
upset over particular omissions are already lobbying for their inclusion in DSM-
IV . Similarly , certain class ifications, such as "schizo-affective," and " bor-
derline" have come under considerable fire with their validities being ques-
tioned . No doubt some of the current categories will be deleted. However, these 
are only spec ific content changes and one does not read il y forsee an abandon-
ment of the particular model. In contrast , several years ago, the American 
Psychological Association established a committee to look into the development 
of a more behavioral description type of class ification system. This committee 
appeared to conclude that while such a system would be valuable, the cost of 
developing it was out of reach at the time , the late 1970s and earl y 1980s . 
However, sooner or later the issue of whether to continue with the DSM type of 
diagnostic system or to shift to some other approach will have to be faced . 
Already statements in the literature favoring a dimensional over a categorical 
approach have appeared . 
3. Greater Focus on Assets 
Much greater attention to strengths or assets should be expected . Clinical assess-
ment has for much too long been almost totally absorbed in reciting psycho-
pathology so that the reading of a clinical report is almost always like listening to 
a symphony of defects, deficiencies, problems, stresses and so on . Yet the 
modern drift of treatment approaches tends to focus on problem solving with 
many therapies attempting to build on the strengths the patient already has or to 
augment those strenghts to help the individual to function better. In light of this 
the assessment will have to take into account not only psychological strengths but 
also assets such as good looks, high intelligence, a wealthy family, a helpful 
spouse or whatever other assets the patient may bring to the situation. 
4. Situational Variables 
Similarl y psychosocial stresses present in the patient's li fe space will also require 
assessment. A step in thi s direction was taken in DSM-lIl , but the calibration 
appears to be crude and without any parti cular scientific foundation. Nonethe-
less, the idea is a good one and needs a more careful calibration as to the rating of 
stresses inherent in various kinds of situations plus some rating of the stress for 
the particular individual in a given situation. Along these lines it seems most 
likely that a state vs. trait controversy will di ssolve into recognition that while 
there may be enduring traits or characteri stics that an individual has, these traits 
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will become operative or will operate in a di ffere nt manner according to various 
situations or contexts . It will be important for a therapist to have any signi ficant 
situational information. 
5. Projective Tests 
Projective tests which have long been highl y controversial within psychology 
face a future of change or disappearance . Those devices which are amenable to 
change to make them more scienti fic are li kely to survi ve. Those that are not 
amenable or can be modi fied only with great difficulty are likely to di sappear. 
Thus for example, the Draw-A-Person (DAP) technique which has a long hi sto-
ry, would appear to me to have a very short future . Over its lengthy hi story 
numerous attempts have been made to validate its propos itions. The net sum of 
all of this effort is most di scouraging (Adler, 1970; Swenson, 1957) . Very fe w of 
the ex isting DAP hypotheses have been validated . Economy and ease of admin-
istration do not compensate sufficientl y for the failure of the test to provide 
conclusions about an individual in which one who reads the literature could have 
confidence. On the other hand , the Rorschach, long the object of vehement and 
derisive attacks by those alleged to be " hardnosed" unsympathetic sc ientists 
may very well be on the verge of a re-birth with John Exner and his colleagues as 
the attending physicians. Exner (1 974 , 1978) has pulled together diverse ap-
proaches and methodologies of the Rorschach into what appears on the way to 
becoming a unitary and standardized procedure which may bring it within the 
purview of science . Indeed , Exner and his associates are treating the Rorschach 
in a scientific manner, performing research to determine the reli abilities of vari-
ous components and the validities of various interpreti ve principles . Clearly , 
they have met with impressive early successes . It is premature to conclude that 
the Exner Rorschach has now been full y validated , but at least it is being 
subjected to validation procedures and in time it is likely that we will know what 
it can do and what it cannot do . 
6. Recognition of Limits 
This leads me to another prediction for the future, one which I make with some 
hesitation. That is, I think the future will see those who do clinical assessment 
shrinking the territory somewhat and abandoning, at least in an applied sense, 
those areas for which the field is simply not ready. The two examples which 
come most readily to my mind are from the forensic area. One is the attempt to 
assess " dangerousness." It is clear from an overwhelming body of literature that 
neither the knowledge nor the methdology ex ists to do this with a respectable 
degree of accuracy. Already the American Psychiatric Association and the 
American Psychological Association have acknowledged the limitations of the 
field in this regard . Similarl y, attempts to assess a defendant in a criminal case 
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with regard to his state of mind at the time he committed the crime, usually 
weeks or months before he was seen by the clinician, will be recognized as 
beyond the clinician's present capabili ty. 
7. Standardized Interviews 
The future is likely to see more use of structured or standardi zed interview 
methods. These methods offer some promise of increasing reli ability by virtue of 
the fact that they will require that each clinician be gathering the same kind of 
data. They will also be an aid to the clin ician in helping to insure that no relevant 
areas are overlooked. Additionall y, it is likely that more frequent interviews will 
be conducted prior to drawing firm conclusions about an individual. Seeing the 
individual more than one time prov ides the clinician with opportunities to ob-
serve the possible operation of situation effects which may be present on one 
occasion but not on another. I do not expect the clinician to give up the fl ex ibility 
to adapt the examination to the individual patient 's needs and psychological 
state. I am however suggesting that the examination not be considered complete 
until all of the information required of a standardi zed interview has been 
obtained . 
8. Demographic Variables 
The issue of race and perhaps other demographic variables such as age and socio-
economic status will have to be dealt with in the future of assessment. One 
poss ibility is that a series of definitive studies may di spose of the problem as a 
pseudo-problem, thus, e liminating these vari ables from further consideration. 
The alternative is to beg in the development of separate norms for various assess-
ment devices such as that initiated by Gynther et al. (1 978). If further research 
supports thi s approach by indicating that indeed there are rac ial, age, socio-
economic, or geographic differences that make a difference, then assessment for 
members of any of these groups is in for a period of considerable uncertainty 
while such norms are being developed . Once again , the computer may come to 
the rescue by expediting the research necessary to establish such norms. 
9. Relation to Treatment 
It seems likely that research establishing relationships between treatment modal-
ity effectiveness and some sort of typology whether it be psychiatric diagnosis, 
behavioral description , or some other c lassificatory scheme will have to be done 
if the purpose of clinical assessment as a treatment guide is to be accomplished . 
That is, even if some excellent c lass ification system were to spring forth tomor-
row, in terms of being a re li able and accurate descriptor of many deviant or 
nondeviant characteristics of an individual this would still not resolve the ques-
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tion of how to treat that individual , although it obviously would be a critical first 
step. The second step simply does not seem achievable without the first unless it 
should turn out that the type of treatment makes no difference or that there is one 
treatment , perhaps some as yet unknown, wonderful pill which treats all psycho-
logical disorders effectively . 
10. Some Other Views of the Future 
Anastasi (1982) describes current trends involving application of item response 
theory, Bayesian approaches to validity generalization, growing emphasis on 
construct validation, progress in analysis of trait, state, and situational variables, 
and recognition of the need for psychometrically sound assessment techniques in 
behavior modification programs. 
Korchin and Schuldberg (1981) suggests trends that indicate "the develop-
ment of more focused techniques of psychometric purity," more reliance on 
lower level interpretations rather than sweeping generalizations; more concern 
with situational and environmental factors; more attention given to the indi-
vidual's own views of his character or problems rather than relying as heavily on 
external measures; and greater acceptance that there is an inevitable role for 
clinical judgment in collecting, integrating and interpreting assessment data, 
although they suggest that more disciplined thinking will be required. 
On the other hand Rorer and Widiger (1983) clearly disagree with Korchin 
and Schuldberg's position that with a few refinements, assessment can continue 
with its business as usual. Their view is that "psychology is burdened with an 
outmoded philosophy, and a distorted view of science, to both of which it 
adheres with messianic fervor." The essence of their position, as I understand it, 
is that psychology has adopted a philosophy of science, namely that of emulating 
physics when that philosophy of science may never have existed and pretty 
clearly, according to these authors, no longer exists in physics. They assert that 
psychology adopted logical empiricism at a time when philosophy abandoned it. 
I am not going to attempt to deal with the entirety of their article. I can do no 
more than suggest that anyone interested in the future of clinical assessment 
ought to read the article, because it encompasses a radical change at the very core 
of assessment-the nature of the science (or nonscience, or different science) of 
psychology . According to these authors these changes are so radical that they 
would require logical empiricism be replaced by more contemporary philosoph-
ical positions on methodology; "analysis of variance, null hypothesis signifi-
cance testing, and classical test theory would be replaced by taxometric methods, 
Bayesian statistics, analysis of covariance structures (including causal model-
ing), generalizeability theory, decision theory , and other methods appropriate for 
construct validation; sole reliance on the experimental method would be replaced 
by an emphasis on using methods appropriate for the study of personality struc-
ture , in particular those of clinical psychologies: and theoretical and integrated 
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papers would be encouraged in place of the fragmented laboratory studies of 
unrelated personality traits that have added so little to our knowledge." 
They do conclude their article with a statement "Finally and most difficult of 
all , we would become comfortable with the idea that there is no test that can 
separate sc ience from non-science, and consequently that science is distin-
gui shed from religion precisely by the fact that it does not require acceptance of 
certain beliefs as an act of fa ith . " 
I take some comfort from the last statement if I correctly interpret it to mean 
that clinical assessment will continue to require validation of some kind . My 
simpleminded understanding of an applied science requires no less. It does not 
have to be logical empiricism or even physics but it does have to work. If it can 
be demonstrated (not just taken on faith) that it works in the field , then its 
existence is justified . 
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